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I wish to thank Don Schweitzer for organizing the panel discussion of 
my book The Lord is the Spirit: The Holy Spirit and the Divine Attributes, 
out of which these responses to my book have come.1 I also extend my 
thanks to Schweitzer, HyeRan Kim-Cragg, and Jeromey Martini for tak-
ing the time to engage my book. I am encouraged by their positive re-
sponse to my work. They have affirmed my basic premise that the 
Christian tradition does not adequately take pneumatology into ac-
count when formulating the doctrine of the divine attributes and they 
have also well received my proposed revisions to the divine attributes of 
impassibility, immutability, and omnipotence. At the same time, each 
reviewer has made important critiques or suggestions regarding my work 
and I am grateful for the opportunity to respond to them again in this 
journal. In my response below I focus on the issues of using gendered 
language for God, the relationship of the Spirit and violence, and the 
adequacy of engaging the doctrine of the Trinity in response to more 
philosophical approaches to the attributes of God. I conclude by noting 
areas for future research. 
 
GENDERED LANGUAGE FOR GOD 
 
In her review, Kim-Cragg has rightly noted that I have tended to present 
“the Spirit as entirely masculine.”2 In the time since I have published 
The Lord is the Spirit, I have concluded that this is, likewise, one critique 
                                                
1 The panel discussion took place in St. Andrews College at the University of Sas-
katchewan during a meeting of the Saskatoon Theological Union’s Graduate Studies 
Seminar.  
2 Nevertheless, Kim-Cragg has misunderstood my book in two important places. First 
she seems to suppose that I would affirm a conception of “the world as the body of 
God” (see my cautions regarding this idea in Andrew K. Gabriel, The Lord is the Spirit: 
The Holy Spirit and the Divine Attributes [Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2011], 141-142) and in 
her understanding that I present divine omnipotence as a “power that never forces” (I 
affirm that the power of the Spirit is sometimes expressed in a unilateral fashion on 
pp. 186-7). 
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I would make of my book. Elizabeth Johnson is surely correct that mas-
culine images of God have inappropriately dominated Christian theolo-
gy and liturgy, even to the point where such images can serve as oppres-
sive idols.3 God is neither male nor female, but beyond gender. For this 
reason, and also based off of biblical precedent, both masculine and 
feminine, and even inanimate images of God (e.g., God as a rock), can 
serve as suitable images of God. Nevertheless, in my book I use mascu-
line pronouns in reference to both ‘God’ and the ‘Spirit.’ Besides fol-
lowing historic practices, as I explain in my book, one of the reasons I 
did this is that it is sometimes difficult to avoid using pronouns in ref-
erence to God and using any English pronouns in reference to God has 
its difficulties.4 Despite the fact that the New Testament Greek word for 
Spirit (pneuma) is neuter, using the English impersonal pronoun ‘it’ in 
reference to God is problematic given the personal nature of God. Fur-
thermore, even though the Spirit is presented with the masculine image 
of the “Paraclete” in John 14 and 16 (i.e., the term is grammatically 
masculine in Greek), Kim-Cragg correctly notes the difficulty of using 
exclusively masculine language in reference to the Spirit. At the same 
time, even though the Hebrew word for Spirit in the Old Testament is 
feminine (ruach), using feminine pronouns for ‘God’ or the ‘Spirit’ also 
poses problems. For example, using feminine pronouns for God would 
alienate me from many people within one of my primary audiences—
namely, conservative evangelical Protestants—an audience which tends 
to use masculine pronouns in reference to God in both theology and 
worship. Since I engage evangelical theology explicitly in The Lord is the 
Spirit (pages 54-72), I unfortunately allowed my concern of appealing to 
a conservative Christian audience to cause me to use theological lan-
guage that can even come across as oppressive in some contexts.5 In ret-
rospect, it would have been a better decision to avoid using personal 
pronouns as much as possible when referring to God, even choosing to 
                                                
3 Elizabeth A. Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse 
(New York: Crossroad, 1992), 18. 
4 Gabriel, The Lord is the Spirit, 3 fn. 5.  
5 To some extent, I have followed the lead of Clark Pinnock, who, although certainly 
recognizing the value of utilizing feminine images of the Spirit, chose to use masculine 
pronouns in reference to the Spirit given his primarily evangelical audience. See Pin-
nock’s Flame of Love: A Theology of the Holy Spirit (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 
1996), 15-17 and 251 n. 20. 
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use cumbersome terms like ‘Godself’ or ‘Spiritself’ when necessary. I 
have done this in my more recent work.6 
 While I affirm Kim-Cragg’s basic critique, I do challenge her 
depiction of my book as “completely oblivious to the view of the Spirit 
as feminine.” Such imagery is not completely absent from my book. For 
example, in contrast to the vast majority of Christian theologians, on 
pages 131-133 I present theological implications (for the doctrine of 
impassibility) of the biblical and feminine image of the Spirit giving 
birth to Christians as they are “born again.” Furthermore, I scold theo-
logians for neglecting this feminine image of the Spirit because of the 
dominant historical preference in Western theology for masculine im-
ages of the Spirit. 
 
THE SPIRIT AND VIOLENCE 
 
Schweitzer’s response to my book focuses in on my discussion of the 
Spirit’s relationship to violence, which occurs within the wider context 
of a chapter regarding divine omnipotence, where I argue that the Spirit 
acts with a kenotic power of liberating and holy love.7 Schweitzer af-
firms with me that the Spirit’s power is directed towards “the overall 
aim of redemption and the kingdom of God” and that, therefore (in 
contrast to the view of Mark Wallace), the Spirit does not have a sinister 
side.8 However, Schweitzer contests my claim that the Spirit works “to 
renew all things, not destroy them”9 and he proposes that “in working 
to sustain and redeem creation, the Holy Spirit may work to destroy 
some relationships, institutions and even living things, that are good, 
for the sake of a greater good.” I agree with Schweitzer that the Spirit 
may lead one to end a relationship or to work against an institution and 
that the results of the Spirit’s guidance in these ways can be painful for 
everyone involved. However, I want to focus in on the issue of the Spir-
it’s relationship to violence. Although Schweitzer’s proposal is not only 
about violence, in his proposal the Spirit is, at times, complicit with and 
active in violence, even “horrifying violence,” in cases that lead to great-
                                                
6 For example, see Andrew K. Gabriel, Barth’s Doctrine of Creation: Creation, Nature, 
Jesus, and the Trinity (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2014).  
7 Gabriel, The Lord is the Spirit, 202-203. 
8 Gabriel, The Lord is the Spirit, 202. 
9 Gabriel, The Lord is the Spirit, 194. 
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er creative or redemptive divine purposes. In such cases, Schweitzer 
adds, the “Spirit cuts into itself” causing pain to the Spirit for a redemp-
tive purpose, analogous to the redemptive death of Christ. 
 I struggled with the Spirit’s relationship to violent acts as I wrote 
The Lord is the Spirit and I continue to struggle with this issue. In my 
book my conclusion regarding this issue was somewhat ambiguous. 
Even though I emphasized that the characteristic work of the Spirit was 
to act with a holy power of liberating love, I also left the issue of the 
Spirit and violence unresolved when I wrote that “even if one did concede 
that the Spirit has a ‘dark side,’ one must also realize that this supposed 
‘dark side’ is clearly not characteristic of the overall activity of the power 
of the Spirit.”10 This issue becomes even more complicated since, I sup-
pose, one’s understanding of the Spirit’s relationship to violence will to 
some extent be shaped by one’s approach to pacifism, for if God is ac-
tive in violent ways, it may support human violence that, some would 
claim, has the redemptive purpose of serving a greater good.  
With respect to the Spirit specifically, we do have to ask the 
question regarding the extent that the Spirit is actively engaged in or 
encouraging violence and the extent that the Spirit is only sustaining 
the person (or animal, etc.) that is engaged in violence. To consider 
Schweitzer’s example (drawn from Jay McDaniel) of the orca whales kill-
ing gray whales, even though the Spirit is sustaining the orca whales (in 
as much as the Spirit sustains all living beings), this does not necessarily 
mean that the Spirit is causing, inspiring, or leading the killer whales to 
kill the gray whales. One could argue that animals, like human beings, 
have free will to ignore the guidance of the Spirit and act in sinful ways 
(i.e., ways that are contrary to God’s will).11 Following this proposal, the 
Spirit would be sustaining the orca whale and withdrawing the Spirit’s 
life-giving presence from the gray whale, but not actively causing or en-
couraging the violence to the gray whale. However, since the orca 
whales need to eat in order to continue to live, it does seem that as the 
Spirit seeks to give life to the orca whales, the Spirit would inspire them 
to kill gray whales (or to cause violence to something else) in order for 
                                                
10 Gabriel, The Lord is the Spirit, 203 (emphasis added). 
11 I have argued elsewhere that aspects of creation can run contrary to God’s will. See 
Andrew K. Gabriel, “Pneumatological Perspectives for a Theology of Nature: The Holy 
Spirit in Relation to Ecology and Technology,” Journal of Pentecostal Theology 15.2 
(2007): 199-200. 
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the orcas to survive. Hence, I am drawn to affirm with Schweitzer that 
the “Spirit cuts into itself not only to punish wrong or destroy evil, but 
at times to destroy one good for the sake of a greater good.” I will have 
to continue to think through the Spirit’s relationship to violence. 
Despite my agreement with the heart of Schweitzer’s proposal, I 
am more skeptical of the value of the metaphor that he uses of the 
“Spirit cutting into itself.” He is correct in his intuition that the Spirit 
voluntarily suffers at times—like a mother giving birth to her child, the 
Spirit voluntarily suffers for redemptions sake as the Spirit draws people 
and all of creation into the kingdom of God and toward the new crea-
tion.12 Nevertheless, Schweitzer’s metaphor of the “Spirit cutting into 
itself” is problematic because in teenage culture when a person “cuts 
into oneself” they are performing a type of self-harm that is usually 
“bound to inner tensions, frustrations, and depressive feeling[s].”13 This 
cutting can become an addictive behavior that people engage in as they 
seek to control other unwanted habits or urges or as they seek to use 
physical pain to escape emotional pain. I am certain that Schweitzer 
does not want to attribute such connotations of “cutting” to the Holy 
Spirit given that the Spirit’s suffering is a suffering of love for another.  
 
THE TRINITY AS A RESPONSE TO PHILOSOPHICAL THEISM 
  
Martini raises another important issue when he asks whether my “trini-
tarian” approach (with its pneumatological emphasis) to the divine at-
tributes can “effectively answer the proposed challenge of ‘philosophical 
theism.’” Martini is certainly correct to say that the doctrine of the Trin-
ity has itself been “influenced by Greek philosophical categories.” Nev-
ertheless, my desire to engage in trinitarian theology is not shaped so 
much by a concern for how the doctrine of the Trinity is explicated, but 
rather by the heart of this doctrine. On this point I follow (in part) 
George Lindbeck’s proposal regarding the ‘cultural-linguistic’ nature of 
                                                
12 Gabriel, The Lord is the Spirit, 133. Cf. Andrew K. Gabriel, “Pentecostals and Divine 
Impassibility: A Response to Daniel Castelo,” Journal of Pentecostal Theology 20 (2011): 
189-200, available online at: 
http://andrewgabriel.files.wordpress.com/2009/08/gabriel-response-to-castelo-jpt-
2011.pdf. 
13 Béla Buda, “Cutting Out Self-Harm,” Crisis: The Journal of Crisis Intervention and Sui-
cide Prevention 28.2 (2007): 106. 
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doctrine where doctrines function as the rules for speaking in a reli-
gion.14 In his proposal, Lindbeck makes a helpful distinction between 
doctrines and their terminology, or, to put it another way, between the 
content and form of a doctrine.15 The content of the doctrine is the 
underlying intuition of the doctrine and expresses the ‘rule’ for Chris-
tian thought or speech about God. The terminology or form of the doc-
trine may vary depending on who or what community is expressing the 
content of the doctrine. Following on this distinction between the con-
tent and the form of doctrine, my response to Martini is that the form 
of the doctrine of the Trinity is often shaped by Greek philosophical 
ideas, but not the content of the doctrine itself. Hence, Greek terms 
like ousia (translated as ‘substance,’ ‘essence,’ or ‘being’) and hypostasis 
(translated as ‘person’ or ‘mode of being’) are not what is most im-
portant to the doctrine of the Trinity. Rather, the content of the doc-
trine, which these terms seek to convey, is what is most important.16 
That is, at the heart of these terms, and therefore at the heart of the 
doctrine of the Trinity, is the belief that Christians worship one God 
who is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. This foundational be-
lief is not dependent on Greek philosophical categories, even though 
the explication of this belief does, at times, depend on such categories.17 
Hence, in response to Martini I conclude that, yes, a trinitarian ap-
proach to the doctrine of the divine attributes does help to answer the 
                                                
14 George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1985), 18. Kevin J. Vanhoozer, The Drama of 
Doctrine: A Canonical-Linguistic Approach to Christian Theology (Louisville, KY: Westmin-
ster John Knox, 2005), 99, rightly corrects Lindbeck’s“canonical-linguistic” under-
standing of doctrine, by proposing that God is one of the speakers in the linguistic 
context, thereby setting the rules of doctrine.  
15 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 92. 
16 This cultural-linguistic or canonical-linguistic approach to doctrine is clearly opera-
tive in my theology when I make an observation regarding the consensus of historical 
Christian theology regarding the divine unity of God while also observing that theolo-
gians express the unity of the divine persons in different ways. See Gabriel, The Lord is 
the Spirit, 106-107. 
17 Some contemporary African and Asian theologians have offered explications of the 
Trinity that are not dependent on the Greek philosophical terminology that has dom-
inated the doctrine of the Trinity historically in both Western and Eastern theology. 
See Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, The Trinity: Global Perspectives (Louisville, KY: Westminster 
John Knox, 2007), 307-380. 
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challenge of “philosophical theism” (a phrase I don’t employ myself, but 
see p. 32). 
 
FUTURE AREAS FOR RESEARCH 
 
Kim-Cragg, Schweitzer, and Martini have prodded me to avoid gen-
dered language in reference to God, to recognize that the Spirit’s work 
sometimes involves destruction, and to be cautious in my use of philo-
sophical presuppositions as I engage in trinitarian theology. In closing, I 
will highlight ways in which these responses to my book have also help-
fully pointed toward areas for future research. In addition to Schweitzer 
leading me to think further about the role of the Spirit in violent acts 
(an noted above), Martini has encouraged me to think further about 
how to revise more divine attributes from a pneumatological perspec-
tive, even to the point of not just re-assessing the categories of attributes 
as defined by classical theism, but also by re-determining the categories 
themselves.18 Furthermore, while I have drawn on the work of biblical 
scholars Gordon Fee, Roger Stronstad, Michael Knowles, and Robert 
Menzies, Martini has rightly challenged me to further integrate the fruit 
of biblical theology into my own work in systematic theology. Lastly, 
while I will probably leave it to others to engage in a worthwhile “con-
textual analysis” of where and how the Spirit is at work (engaging in 
such contextual theology was certainly beyond the doctrinal aims of my 
book), in my future publications I do hope to address Kim-Cragg’s de-
sire to see more reflections on the pastoral implications of my conclu-
sions regarding the divine attributes. 
                                                
18 I have continued to pursue my project of exploring the divine attributes from a 
pneumatological perspective in Andrew K. Gabriel, “Pneumatological Insights for the 
Attributes of the Divine Love,” in Third Article Theology: A Pneumatological Dogmatics, 
edited by Myk Habets (Minneapolis: Fortress Academic, forthcoming).  
